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LEGISLATIVE TAX-EXEMPTION CONTRACTS.
I. The Question Stated.
II. Legislative Contracts in General.
I1. Irrevocable Tax-Exemption Contracts.
IV. Opposition to the Doctrine.
V. Limitations and Applications of the Doctrine.
1. Exemption will not be Presumed.
2. Necessity of Consideration.
3. Exemption a Personal Privilege and not Transferable.
4. Exemption of One of Two Consolidated Companies does not
Exempt Both.
VI. The Tendency of the Court.
I. THE QUESTION STATED.

The sovereignty of the state is essentially indivisible and
inalienable. In the last analysis it reposes in the people
themselves. It may be granted to a single individual. It
may be delegated to public representatives. It may be lodged
in co-ordinate branches of government. Two or more states
may even by mutual consent yield the exercise of specified
powers to a joint government, and thereby limit the extent,
though not the content, of their individual sovereignty. But
in all these cases the incidents of sovereignty are given into
the hands of public officers, and the same power that granted
may revoke. Once lodged, the sovereignty remains until recalled. In no case is it conceivable that these temporary trustees
can transmit to others the trust that they have received, or give,
grant or barter away any of its essential powers.
In our modern representative governments this principle is
practically conceded. Whatever is non-essential or incidental
may be the subject of legislative gift or contract, but whatever
is essential and of the essence of sovereignty is lodged permanently in the people and can be disturbed only with their consent. If one legislature, by gift or contract, attempt to dispose
of any of these essentials, no right vests in the beneficiary other
than the right of present enjoyment subject to the pleasure of
VOL. XXIV.
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the same or a subsequent legislature. Blackstone has stated the
rule broadly that " acts of Parliament derogatory from the
power of subsequent parliaments bind not," putting the rule
upon the ground that " the legislature, being in truth the sovereign power, is always of equal, always of absolute authority." 1
And the rule is equally sound under our republican form of

government, subject only to the limitation that the legislature is
not, like the British Parliament, an.omnipotent body, but is
amenable always to the constitution, and must act within the
well defined limits of that instrument. But nowhere in any
American constitution is there to be found any authority under
which a legislature can barter away the essentials of sovereignty.
The founders of the republic would have stood amazed at any
proposition looking to that end. While individual States were

asked to yield up certain of the incidents of sovereignty to be
exercised in their behalf by a superior government of which
they were a part, they retained in undiminished vigor all rights
and power not expressly granted. These they exercise within
their respective jurisdictions with the same absolute freedom and
under the same political sanction as if wholly independent states.
And these, or such of these as are essential to their separate
political existence, they cannot dispose of or in any way abridge,
and still remain sovereign states.
While the rule is thus broad and inclusive there has been in
one particular a wide and dangerous departure from it in the
course of American jurisprudence. The Supreme Court of the
United States has established and thus far maintained the doctrine that a State can by contract yield for a term of years or
forever its right of taxation. It is conceded that it cannot thus
bind itself to an irrevocable contract for the non-exercise of the
right of police 2 or of eminent domain, 3 powers certainly not
1 1 Black. Com. 90. See also WillJams v. Pritchard, K. B., 4 T. R. 2,
a tax case in which it is said: " It
cannot be contended that a subsequent
act of parliament will not control the
provision of a prior statute, If it were
Intended to have that operation;" also
Perchard v. Heyward, K. B., 8T. R. 468.

2 Boyd v. Alabama, 94 U. S. 645;
Beer Co. v. Massachusetts, 97 U. S.
25; Mugler v. Kansas, 123 U. S. 623.
3 Cooley, Const. Lim., pp. 281, et
seq., 525; West River Bridge v. Dix,
6 How. 507.
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mole important or of higher rank in the scale of sovereign attributes than the right of taxation. It may, therefore, well be
asked on what theory and by what process of reasoning the courts
have come to establish this one notable exception to so sweeping
a rule. To point out the origin of the doctrine of irrevocable
tax-exemption contracts, the reasoning upon which it rests, the
opposition with which it has been received, and the limitations
with which it has been hedged about, will be the object of this
paper.
II.

LEGISLATIVE

CONTRACTS IN GENERAL.

In the absence of constitutional restrictions a State legislature
would wield such absolute sway as to be able to make and break
contracts at will. This follows naturally from the character of
the legislative power. It was, indeed, questioned by the eminent
jurist, Chief Justice Marshall, "whether the nature of society and
of government does not prescribe some limit to the legislative
power," but he concedes in the same breath that the problem is
practically insoluble.' In Dartmouth College v. Woodward,' he
says: "According to the theory of the British constitution, their
Parliament is omnipotent;" and in Owings v. Speed,' he refused
to protect the beneficiary of a legislative grant from the operation of a subsequent act divesting such beneficiary of his title
under the grant, and placed the decision on the ground that previous to the adoption of the Federal constitution there was no
check on the supreme power of a State legislature except such
as miglt exist in the constitution of.the State itself. Other decisions in the Federal courts have re-affirmed the same doctrine. 4
It may be broadly asserted that a legislature, untrammeled by
constitutional checks, is practically omnipotent.
It next becomes important to inquire what checks, if any, have
been placed upon the power of a legislature to make, enforce, or
revoke contracts. It is not our purpose to deal with such restraints as have been imposed in State constitutions, but only
I Pletcher v. Peck, 6 Cranch, 87,
135.
24 'Wheat. 518, 643.

3 5 Wheat. 420.
4 League v. DeYoung, 11 How. 185.
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with the clause of the Federal constitution under which acts of
State legislatures relating to contracts have been repeatedly annulled. The first clause of the tenth section of article 1 of the
constitution of the United States provides that " no State
shall * * * pass any bill of attainder, ex post facto law, or
Under this clause
law impairing the obligation of contracts."
there has grown up a series of judicial decisions remarkable not
only for their great learning but also for the incalculable effect
that they have had upon important public and private interests.
It is to these that we must look for the law in restraint of
legislative action concerning contracts.
The phrase, " impairing the obligation of contracts," is attributed, upon just what authority is uncertain, to Judge Wilson,
a Scottish lawyer profoundly learned in the civil law and one of
the ablest members of the Constitutional Convention. It was
first proposed in the convention to adopt a somewhat similar
clause from the Ordinances for the Government of the NorthWest Territory, which provided that '" in the just preservation
of rights and property, it is understood and declared, that no law
ought ever to be made, or have force in said territory, that shall,
in any manner whatever, interfere with or affect private contracts or engagements, bonafide and without fraud, previously
formed."
This proposition did not meet with favor, and the
clause as it now stands was finally adopted.
Just what the convention meant to guard against in making
this phrase a part of the fundamental law, has been the subject
of much learned discusgion. The subject was scarcely mentioned
during the heated controversy that followed the completion of
the work of the convention. It is referred to but twice in the
Federalist, once by Hamilton in No. VII. of that famous collection, and once by Madison in No. XLIV. When it first came
up for interpretation by the Supreme Court the journal of the
convention and the Madison papers yet lay in manuscript and
were inaccessible; Judge Wilson, its probable author, was (lead;
and the court, to quote Chief Justice Marshall, decided the
Probquestion from " the meaning of words in common use."
but
at
its
command,
ably the court employed the best resources
he student of our judicial history will, in the light of subsequent
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events, read with some surprise the able Chief Justice's assertion that "it would seem difficult to substitute words which are
more intelligible or less liable to misconstruction," and that
"the words of the constitution are express, and incapable of
being misunderstood." 1 From all the evidence thus far adduced,
it seems altogether probable that the framers of the constitution
meant simply to place a prohibition upon State legislation impairing the obligation of private contracts, and to set up in civil
cases the same safeguard as is provided in criminal cases by the
clause forbidding the passage of ex post facto laws. 2 But whatever the intention of the authors of the clause, the courts gave
to it so elastic an interpretation as to bring within its scope all
contracts, executed and executory, private and legislative.
The question of legislative contracts first came up with reference to a grant of land made by the State of Georgia to private
individuals and afterwards revoked on the ground that the grant
had been obtained by fraud. Chief Justice Marshall delivered
the opinion of the court and settled once for all these propositions: (1) a grant by a State is a contract; (2) a contract with
a State is within the prohibition of the clause of the constitution forbidding a State to pass any law impairing the obligation
of contracts.3 This doctrine of irrevocable legislative grants
4
was soon after re-affirmed.
From the doctrine of irrevocable grants of corporeal property, the court passed to that of the irrevocable grant of franchises. Charters of incorporation were held to be contracts
within the intent of the constitution and to be beyond the future control of the law-making power. This doctrine was first
enunciated in the now famous case of Trustees of Dartmouth
College v. Woodward, 5 and has been repeatedly re-affirmed.6
Thus, under this clause of the constitution, intended doubtless
for the protection of private contracts from legislative interfer1 Sturgesv. Crowninshield, 4 Wheat.
122, 197, 198.

See

Shirley's

292, 335.

The

Dartmouth
College Causes, pp. 213-228.
3 Fletcher v. Peck, 6 Crauch, 87.
4 Terrett v. Taylor, 9 Cranch, 43;
2

Town of Pawlet v. Clark, 9 Cranch,
5 4 Wheat. 518.
6 Planters' Bank v. Sharp, 6 How.
301; The Binghamton Bridge, 3 Wall.
51, 73; Louisville Gas Co. v. Citizens
Gas Co., 115 U. S. 683.
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ence, there grew up the doctrine that a legislature can make a
contract so binding as completely to tie the hands of all subsequent legislatures, so immovable that it can never be disturbed, amended, or repealed. The result has been far from
favorable to public interests. Established without warrant of
precedent or tradition, the doctrine has become so settled and
stringent in its application, so comprehensive and far-reaching
in its scope, that under its protection, to quote the words of one
of the ablest of modern commentators, " the most enormous and
threatening powers in our country have been created; some of
the great and wealthy corporations actually having greater influence in the country at large than the States to which they owe
their corporate existence. Every privilege granted or conferred- no matter by what means or on what pretense-being
made inviolable by the constitution, the government is frequently
stripped of its authority in very important particulars, by unwise, careless, or corrupt legislation; and a clause of the Federal constitution, whose purpose was to preclude the repudiation
of debts and just contracts, protects and perpetuates the evil."
As we shall see presently, in no respect is this unwise legislation
more frequent or pernicious than in the granting of tax-exemption contracts, and one of the justices of the Supreme Court has
borne witness that it is this class of contract cases that " most
frequently calls for the exercise of our [their] supervisory
power." 2
III.

IRREVOCABLE TAx-EXEMPTION CONTRACTS.

The caseof the State of New Jersey v. Wilson, 3 decided in
1812, is the first of a long line of cases dealing with legislative
contracts as to taxation. The circumstances of the case were
briefly as follows: The Delaware Indians had, in 1758, yielded
their claim to certain portions of New Jersey under an agreement
by which they were to be forever secured in the possession of a
tract of land of about three thousand acres to be purchased for
'Cooley's Constitutional
tions, p. 279, note.

Limita-

2 Murray v. Charleston, 96 U.
432.
3 7 Crauch, 1(;4.

S
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their use and to be exempted from taxation. They resided on
this tract until 1801, when the remnant of the tribe secured the
passage of an act whereby they were empowered to sell the land
and migrate to an Indian settlement in New York. This enabling
act contained no provision whatever on the subject of taxation.
The lands were sold in compliance with the act, and passed into
the possession of private individuals. Soon afterward the legislature repealed the provision of the act of 1758 relating to taxation, and efforts were made to levy and collect the prescribed
taxes. The owners of the land brought suit to test the validity
of the repealing act, and, after the courts of New Jersey had decided adversely to them, carried the case to the Supreme Court
of the United States where it was submitted without argument.
Chief Justice Marshall read the opinion of the court re-affirming
the doctrine of Fletcher v. Peck, that the constitutional prohibition extends to contracts to which a State is a party as well as to
contracts between individuals; holding that the act of 1758 constituted a contract, and that the privilege of exemption from
taxation was annexed to the lands and not to the persons of the
proprietors; and deciding that as the State of New Jersey did
not insist on the surrender of this privilege in the enabling act
of 1801, the purchasers under that act acquired all the privileges and immunities enjoyed by the Delawares. The subsequent
act intended to annul this exemption was therefore adjudged unconstitutional on the ground that itimpaired the obligation of the
original contract.
Whatever may be thought of the other cases held to fall within
the prohibitory clause concerning contracts, there can be no
question but that this involved consequences of the gravest character, and gave form to a series of judicial decisions that have
met with strong and well grounded opposition. It was probably
the first time in the history of jurisprudence that the sovereign
power of taxation had been adjudged the proper subject-matter
of contract. So imperative a necessity exists for the exercise of
this power, that it is of the very essence of political autonomy.
To hold that one legislature can forever bind the State to the
non-exercise of this prerogative, is to hold that the legislature
can destroy the State by taking from it the means of existence.
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It will be shown later how the Supreme Court shrank from the
logical consequences of its own decision, and how sundry of the
judges refused further assent to so dangerous 'and irrational a
doctrine.
Fortunately we are not left in doubt as to the attitude of the
present court toward this leading case on tax-exemption contracts. In 1885 exactly the same state of facts came before the
court. It appears that for a long period of years after the decision in New Jersey v. Wilson, the owners of the exempt tract
contented themselves with the right to an extraordinary privilege
and failed to insist upon its exercise. But after the lapse of
sixty years some owner of a portion of the exempt land again
asserted his right to immunity from taxation, and refused to pay
his assessments. This led to the important determination to be
found in Given v. Wright.' Mr. Justice Bradley, speaking for
the court in that case, says: "We do not feel disposed to question the decision in New Jersey v. Wilson. It has been referred to and relied on in so many
cases from the day of its rendition down to the present time, that
it would cause a shock to our constitutional jurisprudence to disturb it now. If the question were a new one we might regard
the reasoning of the New Jersey judges as entitled to a great
deal of weight, especially since the emphatic declarations made
by this court in Providence Bank v. Billings 2 and other cases,
as to the necessity of having the clearest legislative expression
in order to impair the taxing power of the State."
"The question then, will be whether the long acquiescence of
the land-owners under the imposition of taxes, raises a presumption that the exem ption, which once existed, has been surrendered."
And on this last ground, thus painfully sought out that the
leading case might stand undisturbed, the court decides that, as
the original exemption was a franchise and as taxes have been
assessed and paid for sixty years, the non-user of the franchise
for that period amounts to "presumptive proof of its abandonment or surrender."
1 117 U. S. 648.

2 4 Pet. 514.
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While the decision in New Jersey v. Wilson was thus open
to criticism, its full significance was not seen until another, and
* more famous case, had been adjudicated in the highest court of
the republic.
The decision in the Dartmouth College Case gave to the taxexemption contract doctrine an instant aud tremendous importance. That decision, as everybody knows, declared that the
charter of a private corporation is a contract and within the protection of the constitution of the United States. The inevitable
conclusion followed that an exemption from taxation contained
in a charter creating a corporation, is a part of such charter and
partakes of its inviolability. It was speedily seen by those interested that a rule of law which was adopted to protect a deserving charity could be as easily invoked to protect a moneyed
corporation or a greedy monopoly. Corporations have been
swift to avail themselves of the knowledge. Under the agis of
the Dartmouth College Case the most oppressive monopolies
have sheltered themselves from the legislative action of the very
power to whose indulgence they owe their existence. Attempts
of legislatures to cut off or of courts to curb the dangerous exercise of corporate franchises have invariably been met by an appeal
to this decision; and it is not too much to say that corporations
may justly claim the famous document as their historic Magna
Charta. The words of Chief Justice Richardson in reading the
opinion of the New Hampshire court have, after the lapse of
seventy years, almost the ring of prophecy: "If the charter of a public institution, like that of Dartmouth
College, is to be construed as a contract within the intent of the
constitution of the United States, it will, in our opinion, be difficult to say what powers, in relation to their public institutions,
if any, are left to the State. It is a construction, in our view,
repugnant to the very principles of all government, because it
places all public institutions of all the States beyond legislative
control." 1
In the face of all these considerations the Supreme Court held
1 Farrar's Report of the Case of Dartmouth College, etc., p. 230; also, 1 N.

H. Rep. 111.

24

AMERICAN LAW REVIEW.

the charter of a corporation a more sacred thing than the
sovereignty of a people. All English law and precedents were
thrust aside. In England the right of Parliament to dissolve a
corporation or to amend its charter had never been successfully
questioned.' The creature of law, owing its life to the breath
of legislative or royal favor, it was amenable throughout its
existence to its creator. The most powerful corporations,like that known as the East India Company,- yielded their
charter rights and even their corporate life at the will of Parliament. But in the United States another doctrine was solemnly
promulgated. Existing corporations, the term of whose life was
not fixed by their charters, might truly claim the attribute of
immortality, States were warned that if they wished to maintain any control over future corporations, they must do so by
reserving that right in all charters thereafter granted. 2 In a
word, the attempt of the framers of the constitution to protect
the sanctity of contracts had been broadened into a foundation
for the most obnoxious monopolies.
The case of the Piqua Branch of the State Bank of Ohio v.
Knoop 8 is of great importance as containing the first thorough
discussion of all questions involved in legislative tax-exemption
contracts. The State of Ohio had in 1845 passed a general
banking act, one provision of which was that each banking company organized under the act should semi-annually set off six
per cent. on its net profits in lieu of all taxes to which the
company or the stockholders therein would otherwise be subject.
The Piqua Branch was organized under this act in 1847. In
1851 the legislature passed an act "to tax banks, and bank and
other stocks, the same as property is now taxable by the laws of
the State." A tax was levied upon the Piqua Branch Bank
under this act and upon the bank's refusing payment, suit was
brought by the State for its enforcement. The bank set up as a
defense that the tax imposed was in violation of its charter. The
Supreme Court of Ohio sustained the validity of the tax, and
the case was appealed to the Supreme Court of the United
1 1 Blk. Com. 485; 2 Kyd on Corp.
447.

2 Justice

Story in Dart.

Woodward, supra, p. 712.
3 16 flow. 369.

Col.

v.
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States. Here a decision was given in favor of the bank, the
opinion being read by Mr. Justice M'Lean, the sole survivor, as
he pathetically remarks in the course of his opinion, of the
famous bench of judges of which Marshall and Story were leading lights. The opinion is learned and exhaustive, conceived in
the spirit of Marshall's earlier decisions, and buttressed with
much of that great master's invincible logic. It had previously
been decided in Gordon v. Appeal Tax Court' that an annual
bonus in lieu of taxation, fixed by the charter of a banking corporation and accompanied by a pledge not to tax such corporation beyond the extent of the bonus, was a contract binding on
the State and operating in favor of the stockholders personally
as well as of the corporate capital. In the case now under consideration there was no pledge that such annual per cent. of
profits should be forever accepted in lieu of other tax, nor did
the question of individual taxation of stockholders come before
the court. The majority of the court, concurring with Mr.
Justice M'Lean, held that the law of 1845 created a contract
binding on the banks established under it and on the State; and
that the act of 1851 impaired the obligation of that contract and
was therefore unconstitutional and void.
The feature of the opinion which must make it of lasting
interest to all students of this subject, is the argument that a
State, in granting an irrevocable exemption from taxation does
not relinquish a part of its sovereign power. The learned
justice says :
"The assumption that a State, in exempting certain property
from taxation, relinquishes a certain part of its sovereign power
is unfounded. The taxing power may select its objects of taxation; and this is generally regulated by the amount necessary to
answer the purposes of the State. Now the exemption of property from taxation is a question of policy and not of power." 2
And again:"A State in granting privileges to a bank, with a view of affording a sound currency or of advancing any policy connected
with the public interest, exercises its sovereignty, and for a pub13

How. 133.

2

16 How. 384.
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lie purpose, of which it is the exclusive judge * * * This
act so far from parting with any portion of its sovereignty, is an
exercise of it. Can any one deny this power to the legislature ?
Has it not a right to select the objects of taxation and to determine the amount? To deny either of these, is to take away
State sovereignty." 1
This argument is specious but, it seems to us, fatally weak.
It is true that the exemption of property from taxation is a question of policy. It is equally true that the legislature may and
should exempt property from taxation whenever there is a
sound reason for so doing. The encouragement of religion and
morals, the advancement of education, even, as the learned justice suggests, the providing for a sound currency, - all these
objects and many more may justify a legislature in granting exemptions from taxation. And it is true, likewise, that a legislature in so doing does not part with any portion of its sovereignty. Anglo-Saxon legislatures in all ages have done these
very things. But always, and everywhere, save under the judicial interpretations of our own court, such grants have been
made with the understanding that they could be re-called as the
needs or policy of the State might dictate. A legislature in exempting church property from taxation parts with no portion of
the State sovereignty; but a legislature that attempts to exempt
the same property forever from taxation does attempt to part
with a portion of the State sovereignty. The sovereign power
of taxation is the absolute power to tax every kind and all of
every kind of property within the jurisdiction of the taxing
power. Anything less than this is something less than sovereignty. Therefore the legislature of Ohio did not part with
any portion of the sovereignty of that State in accepting a per
cent. on profits in lieu of taxation, but it did part with a portion of the sovereignty in binding all subsequent legislatures to
accept the 6ame arrangement.
It is easy to see that such a doctrine might be carried to the
verge of State suicide. Suppose, for instance, in the case of
New Jersey v. Wilson, cited above, that a great city with a mill1 16 How. 389.
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ion inhabitants had grown up within the limits of the exempt
land. These citizens, together with millions of property, would
have been forever free from taxation for State purposes in virtue of an arrangement with the Delaware Indians made over a
hundred years ago. If banks may be exempted from taxation,
so may railroads, and manufactories, and farms, and property
of every description; and it needs only a corrupt and worthless
legislature in order to tie forever the taxing power of the State
in regard to the most extensive private interests. The exigencies of a State can never be foreseen. As welt might a legislature say that a certain piece of property shall forever be exempt
from the possibility of lawful seizure under the right of eminent
domain, as to say that it shall forever be exempt from taxation.
A contract could be made, and a consideration paid, in one case
as well as in another. But such a law would be no more a contract than would a law forever yielding the right of the State to
exercise the police power over the same property. A legislature may always select the objects of taxation and determine the
amount; it may, from considerations of public policy, exempt
certain kinds of property from all taxation whatever; it may
consent to receive a fixed amount in lieu of regular taxation; but
it cannot, without yielding up sovereign attributes, make a bindin g contract, for a term of years or forever, the subject-matter
of which is the power to tax.
As will be pointed out more-in detail later, a strong minority
of the court took this view of the case and dissented strongly
from the doctrine of the prevailing opinion.
The case just under consideration was decided in 1853. From
that time down to the present moment the question has returned
agacin and again to trouble the court, and will continue so to return until an indispensable prerogative of sovereignty is vindicated against the strength of blind precedent. It is needless to
traverse the ground covered by the later decisions further than
to point out the extent to which the doctrine has been carried.
Two important cases, - The Home of the Friendless v. Rouse 1
and The Washington University v. Rouse, 2 - may be considered
18 Wall. 430.

2 8 Wall. 439.
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together, as both arose out of the same state of facts.

Both

were cases where charitable institutions bad been chartered with
a provision exempting them from taxation and had afterward
been subjected to taxation by a subsequent legislature. Mr. Justice Davis, speaking for the court, says: "The validity of this contract is questioned at bar on the
ground that the legislature had no authority to grant away the
power of taxation. The answer to this position is, that the question is no longer open for argument here, for it is settled by repeated adjudications of this court, that a State may by contract
based on a consideration, exempt the property of an individual
or corporation from taxation, either for a specified period or
permanently. And it is equally well settled that the exemption
is presumed to be on sufficient consideration, and binds the
State if the charter containing it is accepted."
It would be difficult to find a plainer statement of the law
established by the Supreme Court of the United States on this
important question, or one more welcome to corporate interests.
To this decision there were also dissenting voices, as we shall
see when we come to a fuller consideration of the opposition with
which the doctrine of irrevocable tax-exemption contracts has
been met.
In all subsequent cases the question has been treated as res adjudicata, although the court has from time to time expressed
doubts as to the wisdom of the established doctrine. In the case
of Wilmington Railroad v. Reid ' and Raleigh and Gaston Railroad Company v. Reid, 2 the question was so treated and no
dissenting voices seem to have been heard. In the course of his
opinion in the former case, however, Mr. Justice Davis,
speaking for the court, says: "It may be conceded that it were better for the interest of the
State, that the taxing power, which is one of the highest and most
important attributes of sovereignty, should on no occasion be
surrendered. In the nature of things the necessities of government cannot always be foreseen, and in the changes of time, the
ability to raise revenue from every species of property may be
1 18 Wall. 264.

2 13 Wall. 269.
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of vital importance to the State, but the courts of the country
are not the proper tribunals to apply the corrective to implovident legislation of this character. If there be no constitutional
restraint on the action of the legislature on this subject, there is
no remedy, except through the influence of a wise public sentiment, reaching and controlling the conduct of the law-making
power."
Other cases of like character have been frequently before the
court during the last score of years, but the decisions have been
uniformly consistent with the leading cases. 1
IV.

OPPOSITION TO THE DOCTRINE.

The doctrine laid down in the leading cases on the right of
one legislature to grant exemption from taxation which shall
bind all subsequent legislatures, has not been established without
strong and persistent opposition. A slight survey of the circumstances attending the decision of a few of these cases will amply
sustain this proposition.
The first case, that of New Jersey v. Wilson,2 was submitted
without argument and, as is intimated in Given v. Wright,3 might
have been'very differently determined upon a fuller consideration
of all the facts. The questionable nature of the subject-matter
of the supposed contract in that case, namely, the sovereign
prerogative of taxation, does not seem to have occurred to Chief
Justice Marshall; at any rate it receives no attention in his
opinion. But the subject of taxation was brought forcibly to
4
his attention in the famous case of M'Culloch v. Maryland,
decided a few years afterwardand again in the case of Osborn
v. United States Bank.' In these cases, while deciding in favor
of the supremacy of the laws of Congress and against the rights
Tennessee, 95 U. S. 679; New Orleans
1 Magee v. Mathis,4 Wall. 143; Tomv. Houston, 119 U. S. 265.
linson v. Branch, 15 Wall. 460; Tomlin2 7 Cranch, 164.
son v. Jessup, Ib. 454; Humphrey v.
3 117 U. S. 648, 655.
Pegues, 16 Wall. 244; Dodge v. Wool4 .1 Wheat. 316.
sey, 18 How. 331; Bank v. Thomas, 18
6 9 Wheat. 738.
How. 384; Pacific Railroad Co. v.
McGurie, 20 Wall. 36; Farrington v.
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of the States to tax "its instruments employed in the execution
of its powers," he enforces the truths that, " the power of
taxation is one of vital importance;" that " the power of
taxing the people and their property, is essential to the very existence of government, and may be legitimately exercised on the
objects to which it is applicable, to the utmost extent to which
the government may choose to carry it ;" that "the people of
a State give to their government a right of taxing themselves
and their property, and as the exigencies of government cannot
be limited, they prescribe no limits to the exercise of this right,
resting confidently on the interest of the legislator, and on the
influence of the constituents over their representative, to guard
them against its abuse." 1 Here was a statement of principles
which might have carried the learned Chief Justice to a different
decision in New Jersey v. Wilson, had they been clearly before
him in the consideration of that case. They were before him,
as we shall presently see, in the consideration of Providence
Bank v. Billings,2 decided in 1830,3 and d6ubtless did much to
induce the rule of construction in that case which has ever since
controlled the Supreme Court in its adjudication of tax-exemption causes. These two cases, New Jersey v. Wilson and Providence Bank v. Billings, comprised the law as it was established
by Chief Justice Marshall and his associates, and as it has continued, practically unimpaired since their day. But the opposition, as already stated, has been strong and persistent.
In the case of the State Bank of Ohio v. Knoop I three justices,
Catron, Daniel and Campbell, dissented, and Chief Justice Taney
refused his assent to the doctrine of the controlling opinion,
although he concurred in its conclusions. Two of the justices,
Catron and Campbell, wrote dissenting opinions. The dissent of
Mr. Justice Catron rests mainly upon the proposition, boldly
asserted and strenuously maintained, " that, according to the
constitution of all the States of the Union, and even of the
British Parliament, the sovereign political power is not the sub1 4 Wheat. 428.

2 4 Pet. 514.
3 New Jersey v. Wilson was decided

In 1812; M'Culloch v. Maryland In

1819; and Osborn v. U. S.
1824.
4 16 How. 369.
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ject of contract so as to be vested in an irrepealable charter of
incorporation, aiid taken away from, and placed beyond the reach
of, future legislatures; that the taxing power is a political power
df the highest class, and each successive legislature having vested
in it, unimpaired, all the political powers previous legislatures
had, is authorized to impose taxes on all property in the State
that its constitution does not exempt." I
The dissenting opinion of Mr. Justice Campbell goes to the
same point, but with such firmness of logic and with such force
of statement, as to make it the " leading opinion " among a
large and increasing number of dissenting voices on this important question of constitutional law. A few extracts will show
the nature and scope of his argument.
" The powers of that assembly in general, and that of taxation
especially, are trust powers, held by them as magistrates, in deposit, to be returned after a short period, to their constituents,
without abuse or diminution.
" The nature of the legislative authority is inconsistent with
an inflexible stationary system of administration. Its office is
one of vigilance over the varying wants and changing elements
of the association, to the end of ameliorating its condition.
"The subject-matter of this section [of the law of 1845 previously referred to] is the contributive share of an important
element of the productive capital of the State to the support of
its government. The duty of all to make such a contribution irt
the form of an equal and apportioned taxation, is a consequenc
of the social organization. The right to enforce it is a sovereign
right, stronger than any proprietary claim to property. The!
amount to be taken, the mode of collection, and the duration of
any particular assessment or form of collection, are questions of
administration submitted to the discretion of the legislative
authority; and variations must frequently occur, according to
the mutable conditions, circumstances, or policy of the State." 2
We shall see later that these sound principles of government
have since received the sanction of another strong and determined minority of the Supreme Court. It is safe to say that a
16 How. 404.

VOL. XXIV.
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large majority of the profession would give their assent to the
proposition laid down in these opinions of the minority of the
court.
In an opinion given in another case at the same term, Chief
Justice Taney says that while he concurs in the judgment of the
majority of the court in State Bank of Ohio v. Knoop, he dissents from the reasoning on which the decision rests. His own
views are explained in the following extract: "Powers of sovereignty confided to the legislative body of a
State are undoubtedly a trust committed to them, to be executed
to the best of their judgment for the public good ; and no one
legislature can, by its own act disarm their successors of any of
the powers or rights of sovereignty confided by the people to
the legislative body, unless they are authorized to do so by the
constitution under which they are elected. They canot, therefore, by contract, deprive a future legislature of the power of
impo-ing any tax it may deem necessary for the public service or of exercising any other act of sovereignty confided to the
legislative body, unless the power to make such a contract is
conferred upon them by the constitution of the State."
In the case of The Home of theFriendless v. Rouse 2 and Washington University v. Rouse' three of the eight judges sitting
strongly dissented from the prevailing opinion. The three were,
Chief Justice Chase and Justices Field and Miller, the last of
whom wrote the dissenting opinion and entered a solemn protest
against the dangerous doctrine that was to receive a new sanction
in the case at bar. " To hold," he says, " that any one of the
annu il legislatures can, by contract, deprive the State forever of
the power of taxation, is to hold that they can destroy the government which they are appointed to serve, and that their action
in that regard is strictly lawful." In Pacific Railroad Co. v.
McGuire, 4 Justices Clifford and Miller disented and Chief Justice Waite put his assent upon other grounds than that the taxexemption was acontract which a subsequent legislature could not
impair. In Farrington v. Tennessee' three judges, Strong,
The Ohio Life Ins. & Trust Co. v.
Debolt, 16 How. 416, 431.
2 8 Wall. 430.

3 8 Wall. 439.
4 20 Wall. 36.
5 95 U. S. 679.
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Clifford and Field, dissented from the prevailing opinion. Thus
it will be seen that the doctrine that one legislature can forever
tie up the hands of its successors in a matter of sovereign importance, was first enunciated in a case submitted without argument and decided without investigation, was afterwards rigidly
limited by the same great jurist who promulgated it, and has
since been repeatedly disaffirmed and rejected by a strong
minority of the court who are firm in the belief that the doctrine
must finally be abandoned.

V.

LIinITATIONS AND APPLICATIONS OF THE DOCTRINE.

1. EXEMPTION WILL NOT BE PRESUMED. - Reference has
already been made to the limitation of the doctrine of New Jersey
v. Wilson in the subsequent case of Providence Bank v. Billings.
It is now necessary to point out more specifically the nature of
this limitation.
The Providence Bank was created under a charter which contained no provision whatever on the subject of taxation, but
authorized the bank ' to employ its capital in banking transactions for the benefit of the stockholders, and bound the State to
permit these transactions and restrained it from passing any act
that would destroy the profits of the bank. A few years later
the legislature of Rhode Island passed an act taxing the bank and
this was resisted by the bank on the ground that it impaired the
obligation of the contract embodied in the charter. In the course
of his opinion Chief Justice Marshall says:"That the taxing power is of vital importance, that it is essential to the existence of government, are truths which it cannot be
necessary to re-affirm. They are acknowledged and asserted by
all. It would seem that the relinquishment of such a power is
never to be presumed. We will not say that a State may not relinquish it ; that a consideration sufficiently valuable to induce a
partial release of it may not exist; but, as the whole community
is interested in retaining it undiminished, that community has a
right to insist that its abandonment ought not to be presumed in
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a case in which the deliberate purpose of the State to abandon it
does not appear." 1
The principle enunciated in this case received re-affirmation
and sanction in the leading case of Charles River Bridge v. Warren Bridge. 2 The question there at issue was not one of exemption from taxation, but of exemption from competition, or in
other words a que'stion,of monopoly..- The charter of the Charles
River Bridge Company'cont.iinc( no provision as to exclusive
privileges; afterward' .the.gislature grinted to the Warren
Bridge Company a frtinchise-for erecting a bridge which would,
at the expiratioiof a fw years, become a free bridge, and thus
destroy utterly the value of the Charles River Bridge Company's
property. The latter company contended that its charter contained an implied contract on the part of the State not to grant
to any other person any privileges which would destroy the value
of its franchise. On this point Chief Justice Taney says:"The object and end of all government is to promote the
happiness and prosperity of the community by which it is established ; and it can hiever be assumed that the .government intended
to diminish its power of accomplishing the end for which it was
created. * * * The continued existence of a government
would be of no great value, if, by implications and presumptions,
it was disarmed of the powers necessary to accomplish the ends
of its creation, and the functions it was designed to perform,
transferred to the hands of privileged corporations. * *
While the rights of private property are sacredly guarded, we
must not forget that the community also have rights, and that
the happiness and well being of every citizen depend on their
faithful preservation." I
The principle adopted in these two leading cases has continued
to govern the court in its subsequent consideration of legislative
grants. AS we are particularly concerned only with grants of
tax-exemptions, it will be unnecessary to do more than cite a few
of the cases of that character in which the principle has been applied. Mention should be made of Mr. Justice Miller's corn14 Pet.

561.

2 11 Pet., 420.

3 11 Pet. 517, 548.
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plaint that the court has " been, at times, quick to discover a
contract that it might be protected, and slow to perceive that
what are claimed to be contracts were not so by reason of the want
of authority in those who profess to bind others." I While this
charge is abundantly sustained by facts, it is, on the other hand,
equally true that the court has been slow to discover legislative
contracts where they rest in any degree upon implication. And
indeed the court has carried this doctrine of strict construction
of legislative grants to such a length, that Mr. Justice Miller finds
himself constrained in a recent case to dissent together with
Chief Justice Waite, and Justices Field and Bradley, from the
prevailing decision of the court. The case is a peculiar one and
worthy of careful study.
In 1853 the legislature of Louisiana granted a charter to the
Vicksburg, Shreveport and Texas Railroad -Company, the second
section of which reads as follows: " The capital stock of said
company shall be exempt from taxation, and its road, fixtures,
workshops, warehouses, vehicles of transportation, and other
appurtenances, shall be exempt from taxation for ten years
after the completion of said road within the limits of the State."
Owing to the fact that the completion of the road was delayed
by the outbreak of the civil war, the State undertook to tax
the property in use upon the completed portion, and the courts
wvere called upon for a construction of the exemption clause.
After reiterating the doctrine of Providence Bank v. Billings
and other cases to the same effect, the court, speaking through
Mr. Justice Gray, says: '" In their natural and legal meaning, the words ' for ten years
after the completion of said road,' as distinctly exclude the
time preceding the completion of the road, as the time succeeding the ten years after its completion. To hold that the words
of exemption used by the legislature include the time before the
completion of the road would be to insert by construction what
is not to be found in the language of the contract; to presume
an intention, which the legislature has not manifested in clear
and unmistakable terms, to surrender the taxing power; and to
I

Washington University v. Rouse, 8 Wall. 439, 442.
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go against the uniform current of the decisions of this court upon
the subject." 1
From this construction of the exemption clause the four
judges already mentioned dissented, and concurred in the opinion that " this exemption was designed to aid the road, :nd was,
therefore, much more needed (luring its construction than when
completed. It seems like a perversion of the purpose of the
statute to hold that it intended to impede by its burden the progress of the desired work, and relieve it of the burden only
It is significant that Justices Miller and Field
when finished."
were the only judges tOking part in the decision of the Home of
the Friendless v. Rouse and Washington University v. Rouse,
who were still on the bench when Vicksburg, etc., R. R. Co. v.
Dennis was decided. From the doctrine of irrevocable legislative tax-contracts established by the former case they strongly
dissented. From the severe application in the latter case of the
doctrine of strict construction in determining the meaning of
such contracts they dissented with equal earnestness. Radically
opposed to the doctrine in 1869, they find themselves the conservative members of the court in 1886. It is interesting, in
view of these facts, to speculate as to what would have been the
attitude of the court in 1886 toward the whole subject of taxexemption contracts had it come up as a new question and not
as a res adjudicata.
The court has, however, been thoroughly consistent in its
avowed purpose to construe all legislative grants strictly against
the grantee and to uphold no claims that rest on implication.
Thus, where one company was invested with the powers and
privileges and subjected to the obligations contained in certain
enumerated sections of the charter of another, and one of the
I Vicksburg, etc., R. R. Co. v. Dennis, 116 U. S. 665. The principle is
fully affirmed in the case of Yazoo
Railroad Co. v. Thomas, 132 U. S. 174.
The Massachusetts court has adopted
a far more liberal construction as may
be seen in Trinity Church v. Boston,
118 Mass. 164, where it was held,
under a statute exempting " houses

of religious worship," from taxation
that a lot purchased by a religious
corporation and upon which they had
driven piles for the foundation of a
building was so exempt. See also
New England Hospital v. Boston, 113
Mass. 518. This is, perhaps, as far as
any court has ever gone, even in construing gratuitous exemptions.
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enumerated sections exempted that other company from taxation, it was held that the exemption did not pass to the new
company. 1 So, where by legislative enactment a railroad was to
pay an annual bonus of $10,000 and its stock was to be assessed
to the amount of the costs of construction, it was held that subsequent legislation levying a general tax upon the gross receipts
of all transportation companies applied to this railroad, and that
the original plan of taxation was not a surrender of-the right of
the State to tax in any other way it might see fit.' And other
cases go to sustain the fixed doctrine that "the power to tax
rests upon necessity, and is inherent in every sovereignty, and
there can be no presumption in favor of its relinquishment." a
2. EXEMPTION WITHOUT A CONSIDERATION IS NOT A CONTRACT. - A second and very important limitation of the doctrine

of irrevocable tax-exemption contracts is to be found in the repeated decisions of the Federal Supreme Court that an exemption which is a mere gratuity, with no consideration passing from
the beneficiary to the State, is not a contract and is repealable at
the pleasure of the grantor. This was so decided in the leading
case of Christ Church v. Philadelphia.4 In 1833 the legislature
of Pennsylvania enacted that " the real property, including
ground rents now belonging and payable to Christ Church Hospital, in the city of Philadelphia, so long as the same shadl continue to belong to the said hospital, shall be and remain free
from taxes." In 1851 an act was passed under which this property became subject to taxation. It was held that"The concession of the legislature was spontaneous, and no
service or duty, or other remunerative condition, was imposed
on the corporation. It belongs to the class of laws denominated
privilegiafavorabilia. It attached only to such real property as
belonged to the corporation, and while it remained as its prop-

' Railroad Company v. Commissioners, 103 U. S. 1.
2 Erie Railway Company v. Pennsylvaniar 21 Wall. 492.

8 Bailey v. Magwire, 22 Wall. 215,
226.

See also Delaware Railroad1 Tax,

18 Wall. 206; Central R. R. Co. v.
Georgia, 92 U. S. 665; Hoge v. Rail-

road Co., 99 U. S. 348; Bank v. Tenessee, 104 U. S. 493; Railroad Co. v.

Loftin, 105 U. S. 258; Memphis Gas
Co. v. Shelby Co., 109 U. S. 398; Chi-

cago, etc., R. R. Co. v. Guffey, 120 U.
S. 569; Id. 122 U. S. 561.
4 24 How. 300.
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erty; but it is not a necessary implication from these facts that
the concession is perpetual, or was designed to continue during
the corporate existence. Such an interpretation is not to be
favored, as the power of taxation is necessary to the existence
of the State, and must be exerted according to the varying condition of the commonwealth. The act of 1833 belongs to a class
of statutes in which the narrowest meaning is to be taken which
will fairly carry out the intent of the legislature."
The general statement is that such a stipulation between individuals" would belong to the category of nude pacts. It has no
higher character because one of the parties was a State, the other
a corporation, and it was put in the form of a statute." ' Such
acts amount frequently to mere bounty laws dictated by public
policy, and determinable at the will of the legislature. Such
was held to be the case where a State offered to exempt from taxation all real and personal property used in the manufacture of
salt, aLd afterward limited the exemption to five years. But the
court in that case stated that had the same provision been contained in a special charter, which the corporation had accepted
and acted upon, it- would have constituted a contract. 2 In other
words, what would be an irrevocable contract under a special
charter is a mere gratuity under a general law.'
It was this same distinction between a contract and a gratuity
that led to the majority decision in Home of the Friendless v.
Rouse, 4 a decision that Mr. Burroughs in his valuable work on
taxation I finds great difficulty in reconciling with the principle
laid down in Christ Church v. Philadelphia. In the former case
the exemption was -granted by special charter " for the purpose
of encouraging " the establishment of a charitable institution; in
the latter case it was granted because it had been " represented
that in consequence of the decay of the buildings of the hospital,
and the increasing burdens of taxation, its means are curtailed
In the former case the corporation
and its usefulness limited."
was induced to act on the promise of exemption; in the latter,
1 Tucker

v. Ferguson, 22 Wall. 527,

674.
2 Salt Company v. East Saginaw, 13
Wall. 373.

3 Welch v. Cook, 97 U. S. 511.
4 8 Wall. 430.
9 pp. 115-117.
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the corporation was simply relieved of burdens which it was
lawfully required to bear.
While this distinction may serve 'to clear away the difficulties
raised by Mr. Burroughs's objections,, the exception taken by
him to Mr. Justice Davis's dictum in the Home of the Friendless
v. Rouse, that " it is equally well settled that the exemption is
presumed to be on sufficient consideration," is certainly well
grounded. It is now an elementary principle in all these cases
that "the contract must be shown to exist," that" there is no
presumption in its favor," and that " every reasonable doubt
should be resolved against it." 1 And every such exemption
must be upon a consideration in order to constitute an irrevocable
contract.2
3.

EXEMPTION IS A PERSONAL PRIVILEGE AND

NOT TRANSFER-

The general doctrine of irrevocable tax-exemption contract has received a further important limitation in the decision
of the Supreme Court that such exemption is a personal privilege,
does not attach in rem, and does not pass with the sale of the
franchises and property of the original beneficiary. This important question was first squarely decided in the case of Morgan
v. Louisiana, 3 which has ever since been regarded as a leading
authority. The legislature of Louisiana had in 1853 ipcorporated the New Orleans, Opelousas and Great Western Railroad
Company with a clause exempting the capital stock from taxation
forever, and the works, fixtures, rolling-stock and appurtenances,
for the space of ten years after the completion of the road.
The road was sold in 1869 on execution and passed into the
possession of Morgan. The State afterwards sued Morgan for
taxes upon the road and he set up as a defense the exemption
clause of 1853. The question thus presented was whether,
under the designation of franchises, the immunity from taxation
upon property of the road passed to the purchaser. The Supreme Court decided that it did not, but that the exemption
"was a mere personal privilege of the company, and, therefore,
not transferable to others."
ABLE.-

I Tucker

v. Ferguson, 22 Wall. 575.

2 Cases cited supra; West Wisconsin Co. v.

Supervisors, 93 U. S.

595;

Home Insurance Company
Council, 93 U. S. 116.
3 93 U. S. 217.

v.

City
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The court in the same decision defined and fixed the meaning
of the term " franchise," so far as such definition was necessary
in the discuission of tax-exemption privileges. It said: " The term must always be considered in connection with the
corporation or property to which it is alleged to appertain. The
franchises of a railroad corporation are rights or privileges which
are essential to the operations of the corporation, and without
which its road and works would be of little value; such as the
right to run cars, to take tolls, to appropriate earth and gravel
for the bed of its road, or water for its engines, and the like.
They are positive rights or privileges, without the possession of
which the road of the company could not be successfully worked.
Immunity from taxation is not one of them. The former may be
conveyed to the purchaser of the road as part of the property of
a company; the latter is personal, and incapable of transfer
without express statutory direction."
The general principle enunciated in Morgan v. Louisiana has
governed the court in all subsequent adjudications of the questions there involved, and has done much to limit the sweeping
force of the leading cases. Yet this decision was not reached
without a serious divergence from a former decision, and a divergence which has widened with the lapse of time. The former
decision referred to is that in the case of Humphrey v. Pegues,'
where the court held that a charter conferring on one company
" all the powers, rights and privileges granted by the charter
of another company, carried with it the exemption from taxation
enjoyed by the original company. To reconcile this decision
with those of subsequent cases of a like character, has proved a
troublesome matter. In Morgan v. Louisiana the distinction was
placed on the ground that while immunity from taxation might
pass under the term "privilege," it could not pass under the
sale of " franchises.'
In Railroad Companies v. Gaines 2 the
distinction was placed on the ground that while immunity from
taxation might pass under a general grant of "' all the powers,
rights, and privileges," it would not pass under a similar grant
limited by the words " for the purpose of making and using said
1 16 Wall. 244.

197 U. S. 697.
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road." In Picard v. Tennessee, etc., Railroad Company,' the
court speaks of " the later" and 11 better opinion " " that unless other provisions remove all doubt of the intention of the
legislature to include the immunity in the term '.privileges,'
In short the strictest possible rule
it will not be so construed."
of construction has been followed in all cases subsequent to
Morgan v. Louisiana, and the court has uniformly refused to uphold an alleged immunity from taxation where the franchises to
which the immunity was originally attached had been transferred.
It may be stated as a general rule, supported by numerous
cases, that immunity from'taxation is a personal privilege, and
does not attach to or run with the property or franchise, and is
not transferable unless by a new and expressed authorization by
the legislature. 2
4. EXEMPTION OF ONE OF Two CONSOLIDATED. COMPANIES
DOES NOT EXEMPT BOTH. - A new phase of the question is presented in those cases where two companies are consolidated, one
of which is by law exempt from taxation and the other not. Of
course herb, as elsewhere, the plainly expressed intent of the
legislature to exempt the new company formed by the consolidation, will be entirely conclusive. But in the absence of any
statutory provisions, the rules of construction laid down by the
courts will govern.
It may be stated broadly that where two companies are consolidated, each of which was exempt from taxation under its
original charter, the new company will also be exempt unless
the act authorizing the consolidation provides otherwise.A In
such a case the presumption is that the new company takes all
the powers and privileges which were possessed by the two
original corporations at the time of their union, and this presumption can be rebutted only by proving a contrary intention
on the part of the legislature.
1 130

U. S. 637, 642.

Louis R. R. Co. v. Berry, 113 U.

S.

2 Wilson v. Gaines, 103 U. S. 417;

465; Chesapeake R. R. Co. v. Miller,

R. R. Co. v. Hamblen, 102 U. S. 273;
R. R. Co. v. Commissioners, 103 U. S.

114 U. S. 176; Picard v. Tennessee,
etc., R. R. Co., 130 U. S. 637.

1; Louisville, etc., R. R. Co.v. Palmes,
109 U. S. 244; Memphis R. R. Co. v.
Commissioners, 112 U. S. 609; St.

3 Tennessee v. Whitworth, 117 U.
S. 129.
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In case one of the consolidated companies was exempt and the
other not, and the act authorizing the consolidation provides
that the consolidated companies shall possess all the rights and
privileges which each of the companies enjoyed 'under its
charter, the exemption from taxation extends only to that portion of the aggregated property which was, at the time of the
union, exempt under the charter of the favored company.' But
even. in such a case, the rule must be taken with the qualification
that the new company possesses such transferred powers, privileges and immunities, only so far as they can be exercised and
2
enjoyed by it, with its different officers and distinct constitution.
Whenever the new corporation is not so constituted as to comply with this condition precedent to exemption or commutation of
taxation, it can lay no claim to such privilege.
VI. THE TENDENCY OF THE COURT.
From this brief survey of the law of legislative tax-exemption
contracts, it must be evident that there has been a marked change
in popular, and even judicial, opinion since the cases of New
Jersey v. Wilson and Dartmouth College v. Woodward were given
to the world. At that time corporations were few in number and
of inconsiderable importance. Since then there has been a remarkable increase in the number of corporations and a constant
growth of corporate power. The exercise of such power in the
corrupting of legislators and the procuring of legislation favorable to corporations and dangerous to public interests, and the
alarming combinations and " trusts " which have been formed
within the past few yeais, have justly excited public discussion
as to the control of these bodies. It is altogether probable that
this discussion will increase rather than diminish during the next
score of years, and that the principles stated in the preceding
I

Phil. Wil. & Bait. R. R. Co. v.

U. S. 718; Railroad Co. v. Maine, 96

Maryland, 10 How. 376; Tomlinson v.

U. S. 499; Green Co. v. Conness, 109

Branch,

U. S. 104.
2 R. R. Co. v. Maine, 96 U. S. 499,

15

Wall.

460; Delaware R.

R. Tax, 18 Wall. 206;'Central R. R.
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pages will be again and again argued in the courts and before the
people.
That the Supreme Court is alive to the necessity of a more
stringent control of corporations may be clearly gathered from a
study of the decisions in the "Warehouse Cases'" I the " Granger
Cases," 2 the " Railroad Commission Cases," 3and Spring Valley Water Works v. Schottler. 4 So far has the court gone in
these cases in order to leave the legislature free to control corporations, that a strong minority of the court and the great body
of the profession have been unable to reconcile the cases with
the priinciples laid down in Dartmouth College v. Woodward.
It is safe to say that this tendency will continue. It may even
happen, as a not very remote contingency, that the court will depart uiterly from the doctrine of the leading case. There are
not wanting those who think that it has already gone far in that
direction. But whatever may be the outcome as to general questions involved in charter rights, it has been predicted by a very
eminent authority- Mr. Justice Miller-that the court will
finally abandon altogether the doctrine that the taxing power can
be restricted or destroyed by exemptions contained in corporate
charters or other legislative contracts. 5 While such a reversal
of the leading cases would undoubtedly give an unpleasant shock
to our judicial system, it may well be a matter or serious reflection whether, after all, it would not be in the interests of good
government and an enlightened public policy.
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